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Chapter 2: 





Histories of climate and imperialism reveal the entwined arguments used to explain both the 
climatic determinants of empire and imperial aspirations towards climatic control. In the 
imperial debates we highlight, climate rarely represents a described natural force. Rather, in 
this chapter, we argue that climate is a philosophical and political category as much as it is a 
material category, one that was deployed by a diversity of actors in changing and sometimes 
conflicting ways throughout the British Empire and beyond. iStudies of climate have been 
produced by a wide range of individuals from foresters and medical practitioners, to ships’ 
captains and religious authorities. Understanding the relations between climate and empire 
has taxed the minds of both imperial authorities and those working and living under imperial 
oversight, yet postulating the precise relationship between climate and imperial control, 
however, has been far from straightforward. Work exploring the relationships between 
climate and empire must account for the complexity of this relationship by examining the 
ways in which imperial authorities both constructed and legitimated climate knowledges and 
by investigating the power of climate as a concept to shape imperial ideas and material 
practices. This chapter recognises the ever changing relationship between empire-making, 
climaticimpacts and climate perceptions. 
 To explore this argument, we first critically review the historical importance of 
climate in empire through examination of climatic determinism. Next, we discuss four key 
themes that are of particular importance to understanding the connections between climate 
and empire: imperial ambitions for climate control; the use of climatic factors to explain 
away political or economic failings by imperial authorities; the development and legitimation 
of particular forms of climate knowledge; and the emergence of medical expertise in 
assessing and reducing the risks of hazardous climates on imperial projects. In each case, 
there is no unitary imperial position,  but there is a degree of reflexivity; indeed, we 
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demonstrate that local climate knowledge could enable resistance to imperialism. We suggest 
that through these four areas of interest, climate and empire became intertwined in important 
ways, helping to frame eco-cultural networks drawing in new understandings of the 
environment, new ways of mobilising labour and new kinds of political and economic 
systems. 
Recently, environmental historians have postulated that climates have directly or 
indirectly determined the fate of empires and societal relations, as, for example represented in 
the popular books of Brian Fagan. iiAccording to such accounts, periods of cooling and 
warming, together with alterations in precipitation patterns, cause episodes of crop failure and 
famine, which then lead to revolutions and wars. This style of writing harks back to older 
European traditions exploring the impacts of climate on human society. One frequently made 
assertion of the nineteenth century was that between the industrious dweller of temperate 
climates and the indigent resident of the tropics. Historically, these kinds of narratives 
frequently relied on geographical and latitudinal understandings of climate, especially of 
similarities among climates of the same latitudes. When Europeans discovered that North 
American climates were dissimilar to those of their birthplace, a variety of explanations were 
offered to explain such variety, as well as provoking debate on whether such climates were 
typical.iiiAuthorities and settlers in new regions also explored and experimented with an array 
of responses to climatic differences, while it was thought that with medical insight travellers 
might be able to avoid any hostile climatic traits. Today, determinists veer between 
pessimism about humanity’s future in the face of inevitable climatic changes and optimism 
that humans can adapt to mitigate those risks. Given the influence of such historical 
arguments on imperialism, it is worthwhile elaborating on these in more detail. 
 In the eighteenth century, Baron du Montesquieu, constructed theories of climatic 
determinism based on a latitudinal approach to delineating climate and its influence on the 
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moral and intellectual capacity of humans. iv  Montesquieu’s work inspired significant 
numbers of followers amongst colonial governors and generated significant debate, 
particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries about the relationship between 
nature and civilization. Rigorous, scientific and methodical approaches in line with the 
Baconian tradition of scientific method made nature more amenable to human actions, and 
led to fresh interpretations of differences between civilized and uncivilized parts of the world. 
Differences among peoples now could not simply be explained by nature, but rather by the 
use humans made of nature’s raw materials.vIncreasingly, Europeans came to believe that a 
country’s populace should be industrious, especially where, as the demographer Davenant 
pointed out, natural resources (and land in particular) were abundant. Where scarcity reduced 
humanity’s reliance on nature, excess land tempted people into laziness.viAlthough some 
recognized that humans could have an impact on climate, as through forest clearance, most 
later, writers acknowledged that agricultural development relied on nature’s capacities, and 
was limited in its power to overcome them. Climates could determine the fate of empires, 
even if civilization acted to ameliorate or mediate that relationship. 
During the later eighteenth century, and into the nineteenth, environmental 
determinists were challenged in several ways, especially from the perspectives of climatology 
and medicine.1 Perhaps the most empirically detailed critique of climate determinism came 
from the geographer, Alexander von Humboldt, who traced human environmental impacts in 
South America and, later, in other parts of the world.vii In von Humboldt’s reasoning, humans 
could cause climatic changes, an argument later adopted by another geographer, George 
Perkins Marsh, perhaps most famously in his 1864 book Man and Nature. In arguing against 
environmental determinism, Marsh stressed that humans were the ones who modified and 
thereby re-created the environment rather than the other way around. Debates about the 
                                            
1 There are of course earlier precedents of the argument that climates were affected by cultivation e.g. David 
Hume. 
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domestication of nature would prove to be an important objective for imperial 
administrations, whereby humans could re-create environments in economically or politically 
conducive ways to empire, rather than merely responding to encountered climates and 
civilizations. As environmental historian Richard Grove notes, human-caused environmental 
degradation could have unforeseen consequences for empire-building through its perceived 
promotion of climatic deterioration through drought and flooding. viii  In this period, 
environmental determinism was also coming under serious challenges from medical and 
anthropological authorities, who increasingly rejected environmental explanations of race in 
favour of arguments that humans couldix manage or mitigate the challenges of living in a 
tropical climate. 
Climatic determinism made a reappearance at the end of the nineteenth century and 
into the next. Its most noteworthy twentieth-century representative was the geographer 
Ellsworth Huntington. His Civilization and Climate (1915)was renowned for its postulation 
that climate significantly influenced the emergence of civilizations. To illustrate this, 
Huntington drew maps of climatic energy zones and allied these with ‘expert opinions’ on the 
zones of the most and least advanced civilizations.xAs an example of his research into climate 
and productivity, in 1943 Huntington discussed the importance of the geographical 
distribution of physical vigour by highlighting that New Zealand workers were twice as 
vigorous as Indian workers. xi Studies focusing on the influence of climate on society, 
however, became controversial, for the Geographical community at least, whose science 
would fall “on hard times” as a result of the re-interpretation of deterministic work in extreme 
racist ideologies in the early to mid-twentieth century. xii 
The re-emergence of climatic determinism has had relatively little academic 
prominence until recently, in part because of these concerns. Contemporary fears about 
anthropogenic climatic changes however have led some authors to draw on historical 
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analogies to illustrate the fragility of civilization under climatic threat. Zhang et al. have 
recently reprised this thesis quantitatively, suggesting that climatic changes are the ‘ultimate 
cause’ of the collapse of civilizations historically.xiii The thesis has also been re-articulated 
several times, with fewer or greater caveats, by more popular science authors such as Jared 
Diamond and Fagan, even emerging again in explanations of economic competitiveness,xiv 
though such work has faced considerable criticism for being overly simplistic and has led to 
increasing anxiety over the possible re-emergence of racialised, deterministic arguments.xv 
 Simplistic environmental determinist stories still fail to account for why in some 
places at some times climate seems to matter and at other times matters much less. Robert 
Marks’ account, for example, shows that technological developments in southern China 
reduced the impacts of climatic changes from any necessary cycle of declining harvests and 
enhanced mortality. The creation of, for example, ‘ever normal’ granaries to maintain stocks 
and manage prices is one such intervention.xvi Donald Worster, among several others, have 
also advanced more balanced approaches to considerations of climate and society.xvii 
 
But in themselves these analyses do not go quite far enough in explaining the cultural 
importance and significance of climate as an idea or philosophy alongside its materiality. 
Hence, we next explore some of the guiding ideas that informed philosophical debates about 
climate and empire, of which we pursue four particularly significant themes: firstly, the ideas 
that imperial authorities wished to domesticate or control climate; secondly, the use of 
climate to explain away economic or political causality; thirdly, that climatic research was 
developed to legitimate or serve  imperial or counter-imperial interests; fourthly, that the role 
of medical authorities, particularly in the tropics, helped to demarcate practices of everyday 
life for both the colonized and colonizer. In reflecting on these points, we aim to draw out 
how perceived climatic similarities and differences not only tied together different parts of 
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empire, but also fostered new eco-cultural networks through the establishment of shared 
research interests, and the movement of labour and capital in response to perceived climatic 
deficiencies. 
 
Domesticating climate and deforestation 
A key theme of this chapter is how various attempts to control climates have paralleled 
histories of imperial expansion. This has been through both intentional and unintentional 
effects, in which deforestation, desiccation and health have probably been the most prominent 
filters in these discourses. Justifying deforestation for either military or agricultural purposes 
became an important focus of study, not least because it was one of the most visible 
environmental impacts of imperialism. 
Making climates safe for empires was an important component of imperial strategy, 
and fostered lively debates focused on questions of health, race, and conduct. We discuss 
health in more detail later, but here the important connection is the aim of making climates 
amenable to imperial ambitions, and especially to white colonization. In writing about the 
United States, Hugh Williamson in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries argued 
that cultivation could reduce forest coverage and thereby the noxious savage airs that were 
corrupting the complexions of the brunettes (whites).xviii In the tropics, the climatic risks to 
the European or American body could be controlled through careful governance of the body, 
by maintaining a moral life that would ensure high productivity rather than laziness, and 
through an active management of the environment.xix Managing the transition of the body 
through different climates represented one of the key challenges to Europeans, as they sought 
to make tropical climates safe for white settlement.xx Climates could also be domesticated, 
and thereby permit European residence, through the design of buildings and infrastructure 
tailored to a tropical climate. Practitioners schooled in acclimatization theory argued for 
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particular types of tropical housing design to enable bodies to adapt to new thermal regimes, 
a feature of especial importance to companies with large numbers of overseas workers.xxi 
These stories of domestication contrast with stories of perceived climatic changes, 
particularly of deforestation leading to unwanted social and environmental impacts. Not all 
climates could be easily domesticated, while interventions to enhance political or social 
security could equally backfire. Richard Grove has demonstrated the connection between 
colonial debates on deforestation and climatic change in European empires. Bernardin de 
Saint-Pierre, for example, who was trained in the physiocratic theses of the missionary and 
naturalist Pierre Poivre, argued that deforestation would haunt humanity through its 
disruptive impact on the interdependent relationship between humans and nature.xxii Indeed, 
on colonial island dependents like Mauritius about which Saint-Pierre was concerned, 
deforestation affected naval wood supply and the agricultural sustainability of those islands. 
Conserving forests was not just about economic interests, but also preventing further climatic 
deterioration in the interests of settler societies.xxiii Climates could shape forests and vice-
versa according to the developing scientific arguments of the period. 
Fears of desiccation also prompted imperial concern, questioning the extent and 
provenance of imperial environmental changes as well as informing state responses to them – 
very often through forestry policies. Desiccation narratives inspired conjoint moral, political 
and scientific projects that sought to domesticate imperial climates. Authorities sought to 
make local communities adhere to European moral norms, and use the land in ways 
Europeans thought appropriate. This meant ins some cases striving for the sedentarisation of 
previously nomadic groups, encouraging agricultural investment while simultaneously 
allowing for the subjugation of local people by colonial authorities. The developmentalist 
agendas of imperial states used the excuse of an apparently deteriorating climate to legitimate 
intervention towards ‘modern’ agricultural development. Vast landscape alterations, in 
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particular afforestation or reforestation projects, were also instituted by imperial authorities to 
‘restore’ environments.xxiv The clarion calls for state forestry management to preserve health 
and protect agricultural productivity and settlements reinforced a narrative of state 
redemption from threatening environments.xxv If climatic changes risked political stability, 
they also opened up possibilities for enhancing state control. Ambitions to domesticate 
imperial climates were an admixture of different kinds of political, social, and scientific 
ambition reliant on different kinds of political, social and scientific expertise.xxvi 
Domesticating climates shored up imperial power by ensuring a continual supply of 
natural goods and resources, while protecting and maintaining the living conditions of whites 
living in the colonies. This was not, however, just about the material influence of climate, but 
was also about making climates safe medically, economically, politically, and socially. A 
wholesome climate safe for civilization was one that was protected from fears of revolt and 
the corrupting influences on the citizenry. The very idea of climate was to be worked with to 
ensure imperial ambitions, whether through deploying it to enforce particular policies or to 
encourage modes of self-governance amongst the population. Climates did not make empires, 
but rather empires made the climates that were then enrolled in support of particular 
objectives, although not always successfully. 
 
The economy of climate 
Discussions of climate and empire frequently invoke the imperial ambition of maximizing 
economic productivity, an aim that raises questions of worker commitment and the optimal 
climates required for production. Inasmuch as the tropics could hinder productivity and 
morality, it could also provide new sources of financial, social and sensory opportunities. 
Here we identify the ways in which climate is cast as a resource and a hazard by, for, and 
through empire. 
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While many debates of the seventeenth century focused on identifying the optimal 
climates for producing particular goods and explaining economic success in this way, Jean-
Pierre Purry, writing in the early eighteenth century after his experience travelling with the 
Dutch East India Company, suggested that there was an optimal climate for maximising 
production from a colonial outpost that was distinct from a specifically geographical, 
latitudinal rendering of climate.xxvii  For Purry, the best climate was that which rendered 
particular economic policies acceptable, not necessarily that with a perceived best natural 
climate. A climate deficient in providing resources for production could be improved through 
labour and effort. Imperial ambition thus could enhance the productivity of each colony’s 
climate, effectively domesticating climatic resources and risks within appropriate economic 
management: for ‘air’, as Purry declared ‘is ever best where most Money is stirring, for 
poverty and want will render people unhealthy in all climates.’xxviii 
The perceived economic costs of the deficiencies of productivity in the tropics and the 
failings of Europeans to adapt did not outweigh the many economic benefits of resources and 
products that could be grown in the region and which were useful to empire. New products 
and sensory experiences for consumers at home and abroad encouraged the expansion of 
agriculture to meet these new demands. Control over territories in the tropics meant that what 
had been previously traded as a good with foreign partners could now be directly produced in 
the colonies. Large-scale agricultural plantations appeared in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, but the rush to provide goods to the home nation precipitated sets of 
environmental changes that were often detrimental to the colony (see chapters4 and 7). For 
example, the clearance of jungles for agriculture often created ideal conditions for the spread 
of malaria, which reinforced a vision of the tropics as dangerous and led to a set of imperial 
interventions designed to restrict the impact of the disease on plantation workers’ health.xxix 
In addition, while the tropics had been perceived as dangerous and unhealthy, from the mid-
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nineteenth century, the tropics--as a homogenised region--was transformed into a tourist 
commodity through its presentation as a healthy and desirable tourist destination. Mark Carey 
demonstrates that the Caribbean climate swiftly became re-made as a commodity during this 
period, being marketed as a new alluring sunny destination.xxx Latitudinal climatic theories 
were insufficiently precise as many Caribbean islands were marketed through specific, local 
weather factors as well as by appeals to imperial associations, such as the marketing of 
Barbados as ‘Little England’. xxxi Tropical climates, although they offered distinct 
disadvantages, offered important economic advantages through their productive and tourist 
potential. 
While climates were being actively domesticated, they retained sufficient agency in 
popular and political discourse to be enrolled as reasons for the failure of imperial ambitions 
or local economic policies. Climate, in this sense of its meaning, came to stand in as the 
primary causal factor when things went wrong, even if the blame might be more accurately 
apportioned to imperial political or economic factors. Mike Davis’ classic work exploring 
late-nineteenth-century El Niño events and famines suggests that famines resulted as much 
from political and economic policies as they did from changes in precipitation and its 
distribution.xxxii As thousands were dying in India from starvation in 1900, the British sold 
India’s remaining grain on export markets, a situation obscured by the rhetoric of British 
colonial officials. One official, quoted by Davis, suggested that the problem of famine was 
one of climate-induced apathy: ‘The Gujurati is a soft man... accustomed to earn his good 
food easily. In the hot weather, he seldom worked at all and at no time did he form the habit 
of continuous labour.’xxxiii In other words, the climate’s material effect on Indian civilization 
was the ultimate cause of the disaster. 
If populations rebelled against imperial policies, then these political uprisings and 
discontent could likewise be blamed on climatic rather than imperial misrule. For example, 
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British coverage of uprisings in China after flooding might focus on the turmoil of the flood 
event rather than the fact the rebels primarily attacked foreigners and ruling officials.xxxiv 
While Davis’ claims may be over-stretched, his general argument is important as it reflects 
on the work that climate does in legitimating imperial ambitions and protecting authorities. 
An incommodious climate for imperial authorities was therefore one that presented the 
greatest challenges for governance even as climatic events really did change the experienced 
climate. The economic climate is thus at the core of discourses on empire and climate: In 
material, cultural and political terms, climates could be both resourceful and hazardous. 
 
Climate and scientific knowledges 
There have been myriad ways of arriving at legitimate climate knowledge, and in this section 
we discuss some of the mechanisms through which imperial climate knowledge was 
produced and co-produced. In a western context, climate and weather had been the subjects 
of private narratives, diaries, chronicles and sermons since the later seventeenth century. As 
Lorraine Daston has demonstrated, a very diverse group of people were involved in observing 
and recording weather in this period, either in networks or independently, including 
“gentlemen, physicians, sea captains, peripatetic Jesuits, erudite abbots and naturalist curates, 
university professors and academicians, travellers...”xxxv In the earliest records, emphasis was 
often placed on local weather and on the “qualitative and narrative framing of ‘important’ 
weather,” such as on the unusual or extreme event that disrupted everyday life and which was 
often explained as portentous and as manifestations of divine retribution.xxxvi 
From the mid- to late-eighteenth century, more quotidian recording practices were 
adopted whereby people collated daily local weather records based on their own personal 
observations. To some extent, this constituted part of an endeavour to collect and organise 
local natural histories. The emphasis placed on the “accumulation of ‘prerogative instances’, 
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and the sifting of textual information--all as a means of collecting weather” also represented a 
form of distinctly local scholarship that arguably played an important role in the cultivation 
of Enlightenment science.xxxvii The nineteenth century, in witnessing further standardization 
of information, marked the rise of the modern science of meteorology.xxxviii 
There were numerous interpretations of what science, and by descent, climate science, 
constituted, and in this sense, Western science was but one genre among many.xxxix Scientific 
theories about climate and weather phenomena continued to co-exist with more traditional 
popular beliefs.xl Many folk and rural genres which expressed “knowledge regarding the full 
range of weather and climatic conditions,”xliwas based on familiarity with long-term climate 
variability or weather knowledge, something Katherine Anderson calls “weather wising”. 
Such folk knowledges were “widely respected” as giving “the best advice available.” xlii 
Wolfgang Behringer, for example, uses the phrase ‘sin economics’ to describe the religious 
significance attached to meteorological events recognisable across various cultures. xliii 
Examples of this include attribution of the revenge of an animate universe against humanity’s 
sins prevalent among the twelfth-century Zuni tribe of southwestern United States and the 
purging of sins through the execution of witches in the Little Ice Age, right through to 
attempts to stop climatic cooling or the contemporary attribution of climatic changes to 
carbon sins.xliv Exhortations to better behaviour or to establish different relationships with 
nature created modes of governance that pinned responsibility on individuals to be watchful 
and careful in their behaviour. Religious discourses endured and were translated by, and 
within, emergent scientific arguments. 
Scientific and folkloric understandings and predictions of climate co-existed in many 
colonial contexts. As historians of science David Chambers and Richard Gillespie have 
argued, Eurocentic models charting the introduction of science to a non-European, non-
scientific audience implied that “localities peripheral to the European centre would 
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progressively ‘receive’ the ideas of Western science, slowly establishing their own scientific 
organisations and personnel.”xlv Such Eurocentric diffusionist models seemed to be at least 
superficially applicable in countries where European settlers predominated in the nineteenth-
century and where the “destruction of the indigenes and their traditional cultures had been 
ruthlessly accomplished.” xlvi  Wherever they were, however, local populations were not 
merely “distant recipients” or “passive receptacles of European genius.” xlvii  Climatic 
variability was a cause for concern for both settlers and indigenous groups. Both 
comprehended and responded to this variability within the frameworks of their own ‘climatic 
philosophies.’ Indeed, in many situations, settlers encountered an existing body of folkloric 
knowledge, practice and custom, which tempered the spread of imperial scientific knowledge, 
and subverted the transfer of information from colonist to subject. 
Nineteenth-century encounters between British missionaries and the Tswana in 
central southern Africa, for example, instance the co-existence of different climatic 
understanding of the same weather events and demonstrate how physical and cultural contact 
could establish new eco-cultural networks. Missionaries positioned the climate of the region 
within what David Livingstone has referred to as a ‘moral economic’ perspective, particularly 
apparent in the association of drought with heathen practices and belief systems. xlviii In 
contrast, indigenous societies in this region conceptualized and responded to climatic 
variability within their own ethno-climatic frames of reference, something that is also 
discussed within the same sources. Rainmaking ceremonies, for example, together with a host 
of climate-related beliefs, represented key responses to drought among indigenous 
communities.xlix As was typical of many colonial contexts, these local forms of knowledge 
were often initially nullified or re-inscribed as non-knowledge by colonial settlers. l Over 
time, however, missionaries borrowed from the indigenous climatic portfolio, adopting the 
local terminology in order to better understand and influence their subjects.li Colonial spaces 
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might, therefore, in the terminology of historian of science Stephen Shapin, be considered 
‘scenes’ in which existing geographical knowledge was applied but where new knowledge 
was collected, exchanged and developed to help shape the co-evolution of both European and 
indigenous climatic philosophical ideologies and knowledges.lii 
Settlers thus attempted to monitor, manage, map, measure and control their exposure 
to particular climates. liii Some indigenous groups, meanwhile, maintained and developed 
various ‘traditional’ means of prognostication, of coping with changes in weather patterns. 
Whether through instrumental means or not, climatic knowledges emerged that were both 
adaptive, enabling societies to manage weather risks, and often predictive, determining what 
might or would happen. These developed within, and alongside, scientific enterprises as in 
the case of deforestation debates.liv Contentions over the scientific understanding of climate 
and its effects were central to imperial ambitions. Indeed, the development of networks of 
meteorological observers in the late nineteenth century followed the clear geographical 
patterns of imperialism. 
 
Climate, health and tropical medicine as agents of empire? 
Europeans had long associated intemperate climates with disease, ill health and pestilence. 
The supposed excessive heat of such places was cited as a major reason for “southern 
sickliness,” but throughout much of the nineteenth century, a key debate for geographers, 
medical practitioners, colonial administrators and naturalists, among others, centred on 
whether Europeans could ‘acclimatize’ to life in tropical regions.lv  In this section, we explore 
the dynamics of this debate and demonstrate how climatic concerns fostered eco-cultural 
networks that fostered comparative scientific investigation of healthy and unhealthy climates, 
and corresponding recommendations for lifestyle changes to accommodate to climatic 
differences. Before the 1830s, most experts held that races could adapt to new environmental 
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contexts, for example, by adopting local customs. Medics of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries recommended that colonists living in the tropics should don clothing 
appropriate to the climate, including topis, spine pads, and tinted glasses, while also taking 
particular precautions with their diet and activities, all in an effort to render the climate threat 
less potent;lvi but they also recommended the emulation of indigenous customs in order to 
facilitate acclimatization in the tropics. According to health historian Mark Harrison,lvii for 
example, the medic James Johnson, writing in 1815, had suggested that, amid the “strange 
medley or ludicrous and ridiculous customs,” Europeans might usefully pay attention to local 
knowledge and practice, including to those associated dress, to strengthen their resistance to 
exotic diseases.lviii 
By the middle of the century, however, such beliefs were being replaced by polygenic 
theories, which held that races were suited to their own particular regions, or ‘native’ 
climates. lix  There were “profound anxieties” that prolonged residence by Europeans in 
tropical colonies could only result in change for the worse--that is, to say physical, spiritual 
and moral degradation, and it was thought that settlement in new territories could even prove 
fatal in some circumstances.lx With the growing adherence to polygenic arguments by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, medical practitioners emphasised the need to both 
establish greater distance between European and local populations and to maintain European 
lifestyles overseas to ensure sound constitutional, mental and moral health.lxi For Europeans, 
self-governance of lifestyle became particularly important in the tropics to prevent a descent 
into the moral ineptitude of living in a warm climate. 
These anxieties and ideologies informed and framed many of the anticipatory 
geographies of European travellers and colonists. But beyond such homogenized, negative 
tropical stereotypes, it was often the case that very little was actually known about the 
geography of different tropical regions, their climates or relative suitability for European 
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settlement. As the geographer Victor Savage has highlighted, only with lived experience 
within tropical regions was this homogenized view of the tropics challenged. lxii  Certain 
locations began to be identified as favourable or unfavourable, healthy or unhealthy, to reside 
in, distinctions commonly drawn on the basis of relative similarity to, or variance from, more 
‘familiar’ temperate conditions.lxiii Indeed, it was through this comparative lens that settlers 
comprehended apparent climatic salubrity (or otherwise) and judged how they might cope 
with those areas that were perceived to be less favourable. Trips to coastal regions or to 
elevations offering more temperate climatic conditions were particularly encouraged. Hill 
stations in India, for example, became temperate climate retreats for European bodies 
otherwise exposed to climates deemed to be overly hot and decidedly unhealthy. lxiv 
Constitutional restoration was also encouraged through travelling or a therapeutic “change of 
air.” lxv  Imperial expansion into the tropics, then, produced new kinds of eco-cultural 
connections, as colonists encountered new climates and adjusted their behaviours 
accordingly. 
Towards the turn of the twentieth century, germ theory began to challenge 
predominantly climatological explanations of tropical disease lxvi The two theories did not 
necessarily contradict each other as environmental and meteorological disease aetiologies 
continued to co-exist with emerging germ theories well into the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.lxviiThe shift to a new scientific understanding of disease may have in fact 
also have enhanced the particularity of the tropical threat. The identification of diseases 
specific to the tropics and sub-tropics, for example, including malaria, yellow fever and 
leprosy, served to highlight the pathological specificity of the tropics and also helped 
establish tropical medicine as a distinctive arena for medical research.lxviiiNevertheless, this 
emergent science slowly began to lessen fears of European vulnerability in tropical 
environments. Now vulnerability and susceptibility to disease became something that could 
 18 
be controlled or at least managed through drugs and personal behaviour rather than by 
recourse to climatic explanations.lxix 
Of course, whether it related to climate or germ theories of disease, or any other, 
Western medicine at no time operated in a cultural void. There are many occasions when 
western medicine was confronted, and challenged, by indigenous medical knowledge, giving 
rise to a medical pluralism. lxx Moreover, for some diseases, and as historian of medicine 
Michael Worboys has illustrated for leprosy in the African and Asian colonies of Britain in 
the first half of the twentieth century, indigenous remedies were embraced as part of the 
“European pharmacopeia.” lxxi  For the most part, however, identifiably tropical diseases 
became symptomatic of a “moral and social sickness” in need of address, and better 
understating of germs and contagion effectively upheld the need for maintaining a supposedly 
‘healthy’ distance between settler and indigene, promoting, in some scenarios, racial 
segregation, and justifying, in most, western medical intervention.lxxii Tropical medicine in 
this way became another tool of empire.lxxiii 
 
Conclusion and future trends 
As David Livingstone has argued, climate represented a versatile “hermeneutic resource” of 
empire for much of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.lxxiv Climate was deployed to 
account for racial, cultural and environmental differences in various parts of the world and 
represented a key philosophical influence on colonial ideologies, imaginaries and 
experiences.lxxv Medical topographies or pathological geographies were created on the basis 
of apparent climate healthiness or un-healthiness. Certain places came to be recognized as 
“the white man’s grave” while others offered opportunity for “climate therapy.”lxxvi Climate 
provided the dominant lens through which to identify, or indeed construct, opportunities for 
colonial settlement and investment. The construction of morally, spiritually and economically 
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wanting environments, but which were nevertheless ripe for economic development and 
which offered potential climatic salubrity for British, and more broadly European, settlement 
helped to justify European colonial intervention, while solutions were sought to change or 
control other less favourable climates to improve them or in some way make them safe for 
settlement. In these ways, climate became an agent of empire. 
Philosophies of climate have changed over time. Scholarship investigating the direct 
influence of climate on human societies has most definitely moved on from the reductionist, 
racially oriented environmental and climatic determinism associated with the age of Empire. 
Yet climate maintains an important place in contemporary environmental discourse and 
continues to have potent political agency. Climate change, of course, currently represents, 
and is being represented as, a significant threat to humanity and as such ranks among the 
most serious of contemporary global anxieties. In some former imperial territories, in former 
African and Indian colonies in particular, media images of drought, floods, famine, and 
warfare in effect continue to encourage western intervention, albeit in the form of 
humanitarian aid.lxxvii Moreover, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, in recent decades 
climate has once again been invoked in a deterministic way in a swathe of scientific and 
popular scholarship. 
This is particularly evident in three sets of work. Firstly, determinism is evident in 
research that seeks to link climate change with conflict, especially where increased weather 
extremes and reduced food and water availability are predicted to lead to local or national 
uprisings and wars. Secondly, it is apparent in what Jon Barnett has referred to as the 
‘securitisation’ of climate discourse in which potential climate threats inspire new state 
projects to patrol borders and national resource control strategies. Thirdly, scientific work 
associating catastrophe and civilisation collapse has explored significant periods of climate 
change in the past to draw lessons for humanity’s future.lxxviii Such claims about climate are 
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often made with little evidence and without direct correlation between events and climates. 
As Karl Butzer highlights, much of this new environmentalism, particularly in the popular 
arena, displays a “continuing failure to appreciate the complexity of such 
interrelationships.”lxxix 
It is perhaps not surprising, that the resurgence in neo-environmental deterministic 
writing has thus been paralleled by emerging efforts to explore and highlight this complexity 
and to demonstrate how human societies have coped with, and responded and adapted to 
environmental stresses via multiple pathways, including innovation and adaptation as well as 
societal disintegration. There is increasing recognition that time and place specific cultural, 
social, political, economic and demographic parameters together combine to construct a 
mediating context for climate-society interactions. Moreover, in a material sense, this context 
not only influences how livelihoods in a region may be vulnerable to disruption, and the way 
in which environmental change or an environmental or climate event is experienced, but also 
informs the extent to which, and by what means, different social systems and groups are able 
to respond. 
Recent multidisciplinary research projects in various parts of the world are affording 
new insights on the importance of complexity, resilience, adaptability and social 
transformations in history, demonstrating how various institutions and cultural coping 
strategies have been developed to deal with the impacts of climate change at a range of 
temporal and spatial scales.lxxx They are also revealing how vulnerability to, and experience 
of, environmental and climatic change, in turn, are contingent upon both temporal and spatial 
contexts, and can lead to an improved knowledge of risk among affected communities, 
contributing to improved knowledge. Such work should be seen as a pivotal counterbalance 
to the simplistic, mono-causal, neo-deterministic explanations of climate-society 
relationships. It should also be noted that in a more conceptual sense, there is important work 
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being conducted on the changing conceptualisations of climate and shifting climate narratives 
over time. This has most recently been seen in work by Hulme and Livingstone amongst 
others.lxxxi 
Notwithstanding these recent trends, this chapter has demonstrated that climate is as 
much a philosophical concept as a material entity, one resonant with cultural, economic or 
political meanings in eco-cultural networks which have variously justified, legitimated, 
contradicted or frustrated imperial ambitions. Climates have been domesticated, 
economically organized, the subject of scientific and indigenous wisdom, and a core part of 
debates within the field of tropical medicine, in ways that are not just about the effects of 
climate on something, but rather on how empire helped re-make the very meaning of climate 
as an external actor. Environmental history scholarship has much to offer in terms of 
investigating climate’s changing significance, ideologically, conceptually and materially, 
over time and in different places. The lived experiences under empires shaped, and were 
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